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Abstract Is the Pareto optimality of matching mechanisms robust to the introduction
of boundedly rational behavior? To address this question I define a restrictive and a per-
missive notion of Pareto optimality and consider the large set of hierarchical exchange
mechanismswhich contains serial dictatorship aswell asGale’s top trading cycles. Fix
a housing problem with boundedly rational agents and a hierarchical exchange mech-
anism. Consider the set of matchings that arise with all possible assignments of agents
to initial endowments in the given mechanism. I show that this set is nested between
the sets of Pareto optima according to the restrictive and the permissive notion. These
containment relations are generally strict, even when deviations from rationality are
minimal. In a similar vein, minimal deviations from rationality suffice for the set of
outcomes of Gale’s top trading cycles with all possible initial endowments to differ
from the set of outcomes of serial dictatorship with all possible orders of agents as
dictators.
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Boundedly rational behavior should be expected in some of the non-market envi-
ronments for which economists have designed matching mechanisms. Take kidney
allocation problems as an example. One difficulty with mechanisms that match donors
to recipients is that doctors are reluctant to state complete preferences over kidneys.
However, the same doctors do not seem to have any problem choosing the “best”
kidney for a particular patient from a given set. The limited resources available
to test whether a kidney is a good match might drive this apparent contradiction.1
Alternatively, consider the allocation of elementary school slots. The choices of a
family in which the mother strategically whittles down the options before the father
picks a school are only rationalizable if the parents’ preferences are aligned.2 As a
third example consider the choice of a medical residency program. To reduce the
complexity of the choice-problem a med-school graduate might use a sequence of
incomplete rankings to eliminate all but a few alternatives which she then considers
in detail.3
Is the Pareto optimality of matching mechanisms robust to the introduction of
boundedly rational behavior? To answer this question, I consider Papai’s (2000)
hierarchical exchange mechanisms, which comprise many theoretically and practi-
cally relevant matching mechanisms.4 I derive two different preference-relations from
choice functions. An agent lightly prefers x to y if he chooses x from some set that also
contains y; he solidly prefers x to y if he never chooses y when x is also available.
While the agents’ light preferences imply a restrictive notion of Pareto optimality,
their solid preferences imply a permissive notion of Pareto optimality.
In line with standard matching theory I find that any Pareto optimum that satisfies
the restrictive notion can be obtained as the outcome of any fixed hierarchical exchange
mechanism for some initial endowment and that any outcome of hierarchical exchange
satisfies the permissive notion of Pareto optimality. In contrast to standard matching
theory I find that the set of outcomes of hierarchical exchange is strictly nested between
the twoPareto sets and that different hierarchical exchangemechanisms cover different
sets of outcomes. Agents do not have to stray far from rational behavior for these
two results two hold; in fact I show that minimal deviations from rational behavior
suffice.
1 These statements reflect a private conversation with Utku Unver, who was involved in the design and
practical implementation of several kidney exchange mechanisms. Consider the task of choosing the “best”
kidney for a patient from a set S = {a, b, . . . } of ten kidneys. Due to financial constraints doctors may
use preliminary tests to limit the set of kidneys which they examine in detail. If b is eliminated by the
preliminary tests, while b turns out to be better than a according to the detailed examination, this procedure
may yield the choices a = c(S) and b = c({a, b}).
2 Xu and Zhou (2007) as well as Apesteguia and Ballester (2013) characterized choice function that can
be explained via such strategic interplay of different agents.
3 Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and Mandler (2015) characterize choice functions that arise out of such
procedures.
4 Some subsets of the class of hierarchical exchange mechanisms have been described by Abdulkadiroglu
and Sönmez (1999), Svensson (1999), Ergin (2000), Ehlers et al. (2002), Ehlers and Klaus (2004), Kesten
(2009), Ehlers and Klaus (2007), and Velez (2014).
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2 Matchings and hierarchical exchange
Fix a set of agents, N = {1, . . . n}, and a set H of equally many objects, called houses.
A submatching σ : Nσ → Hσ is a bijectionwith Nσ ⊂ N and Hσ ⊂ H ; σ(i) is agent
i’s match under σ . Any submatching σ is also interpreted as a set of agent-house pairs:
{(i, h) : σ(i) = h}. If Nσ ∩Nσ ′ = ∅ = Hσ ∩ Hσ ′ then σ ∪σ ′ : Nσ ∪Nσ ′ → Hσ ∪ Hσ ′
maps i to σ(i) if i ∈ Nσ and to σ ′(i) otherwise. If Nμ = N , then μ is a matching.
Matchings are also denoted as vectors with the understanding that the i th component
of μ represents μ(i). The sets of all matchings and respectively of all submatchings,
that are not themselves matchings, are M and M. The submatching that matches no
one, ∅, is an element of M. The sets of unmatched agents and houses at some σ ∈ M
are denoted Nσ and Hσ .
I use Pycia and Unver’s (2014) ingenious terminology to define Papai’s (2000)
hierarchical exchange mechanisms. For any fixed σ ∈ M define an ownership
function oσ : Hσ → Nσ , with the understanding that agent oσ (x) owns house x at the
submatching σ . Any set of ownership functions o = (oσ )σ∈M where oσ (x) = oσ ′(x)
holds for any two submatchings σ ⊂ σ ′ with oσ (x) /∈ Nσ ′ and x /∈ Hσ ′ defines
a hierarchical exchange mechanism. So ownership persists in the sense that agent
i /∈ Nσ ′ owns house x /∈ Hσ ′ at σ ′ if i owns x at a submatching σ of σ ′. The outcome
of any hierarchical exchange mechanism is determined through the following trading
process.5
To begin let σ1 = ∅ and k = 1. Round k: each house h ∈ Hσk points to its owner
oσk (h), each agent i ∈ Nσk points to a house in Hσk . Define σ ∗ as the submatching
that matches each agent in some pointing cycle to the house he points to. Let σk+1 =
σk ∪ σ ∗. Terminate the mechanism if σk+1 is a matching. If not, go on to round k + 1.
At the start of a hierarchical exchange mechanism, agents are asked to point to
houses. Houses in turn point to their owners. At least one cycle of agents and houses
forms. Any agent in such a cycle is matched with the house he points to and leaves
the mechanism. When an owner of multiple houses leaves, his unmatched houses are
passed on to the remaining agents according to the inheritance rule implied by the
ownership functions. The remaining agents are then asked to point to the remaining
houses. The procedure is repeated until each agent ismatched. If oˆσ (h)only depends on
| Nσ |, the number of agents already matched under σ , then oˆ is a serial dictatorship.
If o∅(h) 
= o∅(h′) holds for all h 
= h′, then o isGale’s top trading cyclesmechanism.
For any fixed hierarchical exchange mechanism o and any permutation p : N →
N define a permuted hierarchical exchange mechanism po via (po)σ (h) =
p(oσ◦p(h)) for all σ ∈ M.6 Under po agent p(i) takes on the role of agent i under
o. If agent i is the i th dictator according to the serial dictatorship oˆ then agent p(i) is
the i th dictator according to poˆ. If agent 1 is endowed with houses {e, g, h} at the
5 The restriction to hierarchical exchange mechanisms is not costless. Pycia (2014) define a class of prob-
lems in which hierarchical exchange mechanisms are strictly Lorenz-dominated by some other strategy
proof, Pareto optimal, and non-bossy mechanisms. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) show that the use of ordi-
nal mechanisms when agents have cardinal utilities may lead to welfare losses, Pycia (2014) shows that
these losses can be arbitrarily large.
6 Abusing notation let p be the restriction of the original permutation p for which σ ◦ p is well-defined.
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start of some hierarchical exchange mechanism o (o∅(e) = o∅(g) = o∅(h) = 1), then
agent p(1) is endowed with these houses at the start of po.
3 Boundedly Rational Behavior
Fixing N and H , a housingproblem is a profile c := (ci )i∈N ,where ci : P(H)\{∅} →
H is agent i’s choice function and ci (S) ∈ S is agent i’s choice from the set S. A
choice function ci is rationalizable if there exists a transitive and complete preference
i , such that ci maps any S ⊂ H to the i -maximal element in S.7 Agent i lightly
prefers house x to house y if x = ci (S) holds for some y ∈ S ⊂ H ; he solidly prefers
x to y, if x ∈ S ⊂ H implies y 
= ci (S). If i lightly prefers x to y I write x P∃i y,
if his preference is solid I write x P∀i y. A matching μ′ P∀-Pareto-dominates (P∃-
Pareto-dominates) another matching μ′ 
= μ if μ′(i) 
= μ(i) implies μ′(i)P∀i μ(i)
(μ′(i)P∃i μ(i)) for all i . A matching μ is P∀-Pareto-optimal (P∃-Pareto-optimal) if
there exists no matching μ′ that P∀-Pareto-dominates (P∃-Pareto-dominates) it.8
The mechanism o implements the matching o(c) in a housing problem c, if o(c)
results when any agent at any round of the mechanism points to his choice out of all
remaining houses.9 If c is rationalizable, agent i points to his most preferred remaining
house at any round. A mechanism o is said to p-implement a matching μ in housing
problem c if μ = (po)(c) holds for some permutation p.
4 The Result
With boundedly rational behavior hierarchical exchange mechanisms are Pareto opti-
mal in the following sense:
Theorem 1 Fix a housing problem c and a hierarchical exchange mechanism o. Any
P∃-Pareto optimum is p-implementable by o. Any matching that is p-implementable
by o is P∀-Pareto optimal.
For the proof of the first part I fix a P∃-Pareto optimum μ and show the agents can
be ordered such that no agent would choose a lower ranked agent’smatch underμ if his
ownmatch underμ is available. To illustrate the remaining arguments assume that this
ordering ranks any i above all j > i . Define an assignment p of agents to roles in o such
7 Standard housing problems, profiles of linear orders (i )i∈N on H , are embedded in the set of housing
problems. Given that agents are represented via choice functions (not correspondences), the presence of
boundedly rational behavior is the only difference between the present and the standard definition of housing
problems.
8 The notion of solid preference P∀ is identical with (or very similar to) the notions of preference that
Bernheim and Rangel (2009), Mandler (2014), and Green and Hojman (2008) use to compare outcomes
in terms of individual and collective welfare. Rubinstein and Salant (2012) show that this notion may not
generate the relevant welfare preference.
9 In a working paper version I show that Theorem 1 extends to more general assumptions on behavior.
While my behavioral assumptions pertain to the trading process de Clippel’s (2014) behavioral assumptions
abstract away from the process and directly apply to the mechanism as a mapping from set of simultaneous
choices to outcomes.
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that agent i controlsμ(i) at the submatching ofμ that matches the i −1 highest ranked
agents: {(1, μ(1)), (2, μ(2)), . . . , (i −1, μ(i −1))}. Assume for now that exactly one
pointing cycle forms at each round of the mechanism po at c. By the definition of
p agent 1 owns house μ(1) when the mechanism starts. By the construction of the
ordering agent 1 chooses μ(1) out of the set of all houses. So μ(1) and 1 form a cycle
and the submatching ({1, μ(1)}) is reached in the first round. By the definition of p
agent 2 owns house μ(2) at {(1, μ(1))}; by the construction of the ordering 2 chooses
μ(2) out of all remaining houses and {(1, μ(1)), (2, μ(2))} is reached in the second
round. Proceeding inductively, μ = {(1, μ(1)), (2, μ(2)), . . . , (n, μ(n))} is reached
in the nth (and last) round. The proof adapts the above arguments to the general case
with any ordering and multiple cycles in one round.
Proof To prove the first part fix a P∃-Pareto-optimal μ. Then, I claim there exists
an ordering f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} of the agents such that μ( f (i)) ∈ S and
j > i imply c f (i)(S) 
= μ( f ( j)). So the i th agent (according to the ordering f )
never chooses a match μ( f ( j)) of a lower ranked agent f ( j) with j > i if μ( f (i)),
his own match under μ, is available. To see this suppose there was no agent i∗, who
choosesμ(i∗)whenever it is available. So suppose that for each agent i there exists a set
Si ⊂ H , such thatμ(i) ∈ Si andμ(i) 
= ci (Si ). Now let each agent i point to the agent
who is matched with ci (Si ) under μ. The matching μ′, with μ′(i) = ci (Si ) for any
agent i in some pointing cycle and μ(i) = μ′(i) otherwise, P∃-Pareto dominates μ, a
contradiction. So some agent i∗ choosesμ(i∗)whenever it is available. Set f (1) := i∗.
Since the restriction of μ to N \ { f (1)} and H \ {μ( f (1))} is also P∃-Pareto-optimal,
the inductive application of the above arguments implies the existence of the ordering
f .
For each i define μi as the submatching of μ that matches the first i − 1 agents
according to the ordering f , so μi := {( f (1), μ( f (1))), ( f (2), μ( f (2))) . . . ( f (i −
1), μ( f (i − 1)))}. Define p such that (po)μi (μ( f (i))) = f (i) for all i ∈ N .10 So
p is such that the i th agent in the ordering owns his match under μ at the submatching
of μ that matches all agents who are ordered before him.
I show next that any round of po at c that starts with a submatching σ ⊂ μ must
end with a submatching σ ′ ⊂ μ. Fix any σ ⊂ μ. To see that house μ( f (i)) ∈ Hσ is
owned by an agent f ( j) with i ≥ j , suppose some agent f ( j) owns a house μ( f (i))
with j ≥ i (so (po)σ (μ( f (i))) = f ( j)). Since σ ⊂ μ and μ( f (i)) /∈ Hσ agent
f (i) is not matched at σ . Since po is a hierarchical exchange mechanism and since
neither house μ( f (i)) nor agents f (i) and f ( j) are matched under μi ∪ σ we obtain
f ( j) = (po)σ (μ( f (i))) = (po)σ∪μi (μ( f (i))) = (po)μi (μ( f (i))) = f (i),
where the last equality follows from the definition of p. We can conclude that
(po)σ (μ( f (i))) = f ( j) implies i ≥ j and any house μ( f (i)) points to an agent
10 To see that p is well-defined note that p declares agent f (i) to be the owner of μ( f (i)) at μi . Since any
μ( f ( j)) with j < i is matched under μi the role of owner of μ( f (i)) at μi differs from the role of owner
of μ( f ( j)) at μ j ⊂ μi for any j < i . So p specifies a role for agent f (i) that differs from the all roles to




f ( j) with i ≥ j . Since c f ( j)(Hσ ) = μ( f (i)) implies i ≤ j any unmatched agent
f ( j) points to a house μ( f (i)) with i ≤ j . Consequently any cycle at σ involves just
one agent f ( j) and his match μ( f ( j)) and any round starting with a submatching
σ ⊂ μ ends with a submatching σ ′ ⊂ μ. Since the trading process starts with ∅ ⊂ μ
and since it must end with a matching, we obtain (po)(c) = μ and thereby the first
part of Theorem 1.
To see the second part of Theorem 1 fix any μ = (po)(c). Assume w.l.o.g.
that agents {1, . . . , j} are matched in the first round of the mechanism. So for each
i ≤ j μ(i) is P∀i -optimal in H . By the same argument, house μ(i) is P∀i -optimal in
H\{μ(1), . . . , μ( j)} if agent i ismatched in the second round. Proceeding inductively,
we see that μ is P∀-Pareto-optimal. unionsq
To see that the set of matchings implementable through hierarchical exchange is
generally strictly nested between the sets of P∃- and P∀-Pareto optima consider the
following two examples. Example 1 shows that some P∃-Pareto-inferior matchings
are p-implementable by any hierarchical exchange mechanism. Example 2 shows that
not every P∀-Pareto-optimal matching is p-implementable. For both examples let
H = {x, y, z, w}, N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let x ∗i y ∗i z ∗i w rationalize the choice
function c∗i . Arbitrarily fix all choices that are not explicitly mentioned.
Example 1 Define cα such that cα1 := c∗1, cα2 := c∗2, cα3 (S) := y if y ∈ S,
cα3 ({x, z, w}) := w, cα3 ({z, w}) := z, cα4 (S) := x if x ∈ S, cα4 ({y, z, w}) := z, and
cα4 ({z, w}) := w. The matching μα := (x, y, z, w) is not P∃-Pareto-optimal in cα
since cα3 ({x, z, w}) = w and cα4 ({y, z, w}) = z implywP∃3 z and zP∃4 w. Fix any hierar-
chical exchange mechanism o and define p such that 1 initially owns x and 2 owns y at
the submatching {(1, x)}, formally (po)∅(x) := 1 and (po){(1,x)}(y) := 2. If there
are exactly two owners at {(1, x)} under po, 3 is the other owner, if there are three
owners, let (po){(1,x)}(w) = 4. In the first round of the mechanism agents 1, 2, and 4
point to x while 3 points to y = cα3 (H). Each house h points to its owner (po)∅(h),
so house x points to 1. Moreover, y cannot point to 3, since (po){(1,x)}(y) = 2
implies (po)∅(y) 
= 3. Exactly one cycle forms, and the submatching {(1, x)} is
reached. At {(1, x)} agents 2 and 3 point to y = cα2 ({y, z, w}) = cα3 ({y, z, w}). Given
that agent 2 owns house y at {(1, x)}, agent 2 and y form a cycle. This is the only
cycle: if 4 owns a house at {(1, x)} he points to cα4 ({y, z, w}) = z which is owned by
3 at {(1, x)}. Only 3, 4, z and w are left in the next round. Since cα3 ({z, w}) = z and
cα4 ({z, w}) = w the desired matching obtains: (po)(cα) = μα .
Example 2 Define cβ such that cβi := c∗i for i 
= 3, cβ3 (S) := y if y ∈ S,
cβ3 ({x, z, w}) := z, and cβ3 ({z, w}) := w. The matching μβ := (x, y, z, w) is P∀-
Pareto optimal in cβ . Suppose o(cβ) = μβ held for some hierarchical exchange
mechanism o. Since cβi (H) equals x for agents i = 1, 2, and 4 while it equals y for
agent i = 3 and since the first round must produce a submatching σ ⊂ μβ only agent
1 and house x are matched in that first round. By the same logic, only agent 2 and
house y are matched in the second round. In the third round, agents 3 and 4 point to
cβ3 ({z, w}) = w and cβ4 ({z, w}) = z, contradicting o(cβ) = μβ .
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The next example shows that serial dictatorship and Gale’s top trading cycles may
p-implement different sets of matchings with boundedly rational agents. The example
sheds some light on possible extensions of the growing literature on the equiva-
lence between random serial dictatorship and other random matching mechanisms.
According to random serial dictatorship the order of all agents as dictators is drawn
from a uniform distribution over all such orders. Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998)
and Knuth (1996) independently found that random serial dictatorship is identical to
the “core from random endowments” which starts Gale’s top trading cycles from an
endowment that has been randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over all pos-
sible endowments.11 Example 3 shows that the supports of the two random matching
mechanisms differ with boundedly rational behavior.
Example 3 Let H = {x, y, z}, N = {1, 2, 3} and define cγ such that cγ1 ({x, y, z}) :=
x , cγ1 ({x, z}) := z, cγ2 ({x, y, z}) := y, and cγ2 ({y, z}) := z. Let x γ3 y γ3 z
rationalize cγ3 . Gale’s top trading cycles with the initial endowment μ
γ := (x, y, z)
implements μγ in cγ given that agents 1 and 2 choose μγ (1) and μγ (2) out of the
grand set. For μγ to be p-implementable via serial dictatorship either 1 or 2 has to
be the first dictator. But if either 1 or 2 is the first dictator, neither one of the two
remaining agents would pick μγ (i) as the second dictator.
The choice behavior assumed in Examples 1, 2, and 3 is not wildly irrational. Quite
to the contrary the behavior in each of these examples only minimally deviates from
rationality. To make this statement precise requires a formal way of measuring the
degree of irrationality. However, different theories in the literature use different mea-
sures of irrationality. Behavior that is sequentially rationalizable following Manzini
and Mariotti (2007) is minimally irrational if two rationales suffice to explain it.
Behavior that can be explained as choices via checklist following Mandler (2015) is
minimally irrational if the checklist has length two. The minimal game tree that may
explain boundedly rational behavior following Xu and Zhou (2007) has two agents
and two nodes. Kalai (2002), Ambrus and Rozen (2015), Apesteguia and Ballester
(2014) and Manzini and Mariotti (2012) define yet further measures of irrationality.
All these theories agree that ci has to violateWARPat least once to qualify as bound-
edly rational. To judge whether ci is minimally irrational according to the theories
mentioned above we need to know ci (S) for a variety choice sets S. Consider a choice
set with three elements. Appropriately renaming of the choice set as X = {x, y, z},
ci ({x, y, z}) = x and ci ({x, y}) = y must hold for ci to violate WARP. For ci to
be minimally irrational some theories then require the choice ci ({y, z}) = z; others
do not.12 What stands out about Examples 1, 2, and 3 is that all choice functions
in these examples are either rationalizable or they violate WARP exactly once. The
omission of some (arbitrarily fixed) choices turns out to be more than a notational
convenience. These omitted choices were not used to establish any of the points made
11 This result has been extended to larger sets of mechanisms by Carroll (2014), Pathak and Sethuraman
(2011), Pycia and Liu (2013) and Bade (2014).
12 For ci to be rationalizable by two sequential rationales following Manzini and Mariotti (2007)
ci ({y, z}) = z must hold. However, in the framework of Kalai (2002), two rationales suffice to rationalize
ci , whether we let ci ({y, z}) = z or ci ({y, z}) = y.
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in the examples and we may fix them to fit any desired notion of minimal irrationality.
In sum we obtain that, no matter how little irrationality we permit in housing prob-
lems and no matter which theory we use to measure the degree of irrationality, some
P∀−Pareto-optimal matchings are not implementable by any hierarchical exchange
mechanism and some P∃-Pareto dominated matchings are p-implementable by any
hierarchical exchange mechanism. Finally, serial dictatorship and Gale’s top trading
cycles p-implement different sets of matchings - even if we allow only minimal devi-
ations from rationalizability.
5 Conclusion
Hierarchical exchangemechanisms canbeviewed as a versionof free trade inmatching
environments, where indivisible goods have to be matched to agents without recourse
to prices. At any moment in the mechanism, each house is owned by someone, in
the sense that the owner can freely appropriate or exchange the house. Hierarchical
exchange mechanisms allow for a broad and fine spectrum of initial endowments,
ranging from maximal to minimal inequality (from serial dictatorship to Gale’s top
trading cycles).13 Since the results presented here hold for all hierarchical exchange
mechanisms, they automatically hold for any subset thereof. The results apply in
particular if we adopt amore restrictive notion of free trade for matching environments
such as Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez’ Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999) top trading
cycles mechanisms or Gale’s top trading cycles.
Identifying hierarchical exchange mechanisms with free trade the main results of
the paper can be interpreted as versions of the first and second fundamental theorem
of welfare economics for the case of boundedly rational behavior.14 The second part
of Theorem 1 corresponds to a First Welfare Theorem for solid preferences: any
matching that arises out of free trade is P∀-Pareto optimal. The first part corresponds
to a Second Welfare Theorem for light preferences:15 any P∃-Pareto optimum can be
13 The analogy has its limits. Owners are, for example, neither allowed to destroy their houses nor to
determine the heirs of their houses as they leave the mechanism.
14 All fundamental theorems of welfare economics with boundedly rational agents that I am aware of
concern market environments with divisible goods. Bernheim and Rangel (2009) prove a First Welfare
Theorem for markets that are standard except for the assumption that the agents’ behavior need not be
rationalizable. Their notion of Pareto optimality relies on a notion of preferences that is very similar to the
solid preferences defined here. This result aligns with the first inclusion relation of Theorem 1. Interestingly,
Mandler (2014) proves a version of the Second Welfare Theorem that also defines Pareto optimality with
respect to P∀-preferences. This discrepancy is explained by Mandler’s (2014) assumption that agents act
fully rationally according to their solid preferences. In Mandler (2014) the choice functions only serve to
construct these preferences, individuals are always willing to select any preference-maximal element of a
choice set. I, in contrast, not only use the choice functions to construct the P∀-preferences; I also impose
that for any agent’s choice in a mechanism there needs to be some set that is consistent with the underlying
facts, such that the agent’s choice can be construed as a choice from this set. The same comments apply
to the comparison between my results and the welfare theorems in Fon and Otani (1979). However there
is an additional difference as Fon and Otani (1979) assumes intransitive and incomplete preferences. The
assumption of such preferences rules out many irregularities that are permissible in the present framework.
15 Due to the finiteness ofmatching problems this SecondWelfare Theorem does without local nonsatiation
or convex upper contour sets.
123
Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms ... 509
p-implemented by any hierarchical exchangemechanism. Examples 1 and 2 show that
the respective stronger versions of the two fundamental theorems do not hold: Some
matchings that arise out of free trade are not P∃-Pareto optimal and some P∀-Pareto
optima cannot be achieved through free trade.
As a further step one could explicitly model the reasons for particular forms of
bounded rationality and/or decision procedures. One could, for example, assume that
patients do have (linear) preferences over kidneys, but that it is costly to learn these
preferences. In this case the observed bounded rationality can be derived from a fully
rational (but unobserved) preference. An allocation mechanism would then interact
with some form of strategic information acquisition. Bade (2015) shows that serial
dictatorship is the only ex ante Pareto optimal, non-bossy and strategy proof mecha-
nism in a matching environment with endogenous information acquisition. Similarly,
one could explicitly model the interaction between family members when selecting a
mechanism for school choice.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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